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Review Essay
Avery Goldstein and Edward D. Mansfield (eds) (2012) The Nexus of Economics, 
Security, and International Relations in East Asia. Stanford Security Studies, 
Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press (ISBN 978-0-8047-8273-9, cloth; ISBN 
978-0-8047-8274-6, pbk.)
The importance of security issues in the international relations of East Asia 
is nothing new to academia. It has been widely analysed long before the topic 
moved to the centre of world attention with the escalating territorial conflicts in 
the South China and East China Seas. However, this edited volume is one of the 
first to approach the issues from an international political economy perspective, 
focusing on the linkage between security and economics.  The book grew out of 
two conferences sponsored by the Christopher H. Browne Center for International 
Politics of University of Pennsylvania. It is edited by two Browne Center scholars, 
Avery Goldstein, a China expert, and Edward D. Mansfield, a leading name in the 
IPE of trade and security, and brings together recognised American and Chinese 
scholars. The volume promises to throw light on one of the most complex issues 
in current international politics: the interaction of economic interdependence in 
the East Asian region with the challenges to regional security and international 
relations associated with the rise of China to regional power status.
China’s rise does not only pose a challenge to East Asian economic and 
security relations. It also challenges IR and IPE scholarship to advance 
analytically well-founded understanding of this phenomenal change. From an 
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IR point of view it is becoming increasingly obvious that the era in which China 
followed Deng Xiaoping’s advice of ‘hide your capability and bide your time’ is 
drawing to a close. Instead China’s new regional assertiveness, especially in the 
East and South China Seas, tries to ‘redefine the status quo’, as ‘The Diplomat’ 
magazine put it. China is using strategically economic control over national 
markets and international investment flows to press its high politics claims, 
especially in maritime territorial affairs. Consequently, not only do we face a 
region in which the rising regional power implicitly challenges the status quo by 
outlining its own Monroe doctrine for East Asia, as the Financial Times recently 
suggested. It also is backing up this challenge by using its central position 
in regional economic interdependence as a tool of statecraft to exert political 
influence over its regional counterparts.  To complicate the issue further, this 
major shift in the nexus between security and economic regional relations has 
to be interpreted in the light of the reaction and response of the other two major 
powers with a stake in the region and by taking account of the regional regimes of 
economic and security cooperation. How do Japan and, arguably more importantly, 
the U.S., as the region’s traditional stabiliser, interact with the China challenge? 
How good are institutionalised regional cooperation frameworks such as ASEAN-
Plus-Three in managing the growing geo-economic and security tensions? And, 
last but not least, what is the domestic nature of China’s rising power? How does 
its internal political economy and politics interact with the country’s external 
political-economic and security strategy in East Asia?  This volume has to be 
evaluated as to whether it can address these underlying issues behind the 
increasing uncertainties characterising East Asian international relations. Where 
is China’s much advertised peaceful rise heading for? Should we realistically 
worry about regional military clashes with hard to calculate potential for all-
out escalation? Can we rest assured that regional economic interdependence 
can be trusted to discourage power politics about territory - exploiting economic 
vulnerability - from turning into open conflict?
How good are the chapters in this edited volume in addressing these 
concerns? Overall, the contributions are informative, covering a wide range of 
issues, perspectives and analyses, as one would expect from an edited volume. 
However, the contributions are of mixed analytical value, depending on the 
author and the topic covered. Clearly, the strength of the book lies in addressing 
in a competent and multi-faceted fashion important issues of the economics-
security nexus.  But the volume, to some extent, tiptoes around the elephant 
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in the room: the problem of China’s growing regional assertiveness.  This is a 
weakness which leads to the impression that the book somehow fails to live 
up to the challenge. However, as a good academic basis for an analysis of the 
new regional economic and security dynamics and as a collection of succinct 
contributions investigating diverse and important aspects of East Asia’s economy-
security nexus, the volume is valuable for both research and teaching. Regrettably, 
originating from Sino-American academic cooperation, the edition is short of an 
analysis dedicated specifically to explaining the complexities of Japan’s role in the 
East Asian political economy and security concert. This is a pity, given the critical 
role played by Japan - its regional economic exposure and the interaction of its 
domestic political problems with the security issues in the East China Sea.
The contributions in this volume can be roughly grouped into traditional 
Western IR-style rationalist analyses - realist and liberal-institutionalist - on the 
one hand and more interpretative constructivist approaches with often Chinese 
characteristics on the other hand. There exists a tangible divide between American 
authors and their Chinese colleagues, with the US academics taking a more 
analytical and factual stance whereas the Chinese scholars, with the exception 
of Zhang Tuosheng, prefer a more speculative and interpretative perspective. 
Some chapters focus on regional institutionalised economic cooperation and the 
potential of those regimes to manage and defuse the region’s severe security 
issues, whereas others analyse these security issues in the light of IPE. The final 
chapter by Yuan Peng deals directly with Sino-U.S. relations.
The volume starts with Avery Goldstein’s and Edward D. Mansfield’s 
introductory chapter on ‘The Political Economy of Regional Security in East Asia’, 
an excellent overview of conceptual approaches to thinking about East Asian IR 
and IPE and the issues at stake. The authors start from the question of what 
explains the remarkable long period of peace and rising prosperity in the 
region and how enduring this fortunate trajectory can be expected to be. As 
they demonstrate, on the one hand regional interdependence is intensifying. 
On the other hand military rivalry and military spending, especially by China, 
is increasing at a worrying scale. Especially maritime territorial disputes are 
on the rise. In addition, the old regional tensions surrounding North Korea and 
Taiwan remain unresolved. They rightly identify that the key parameters for 
an interpretation of this complex situation are the rise of China and the role 
played by the U.S. in the region, and consequently the issue of Sino-U.S. relations. 
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Reviewing main IR paradigms, they point out that it depends on the approach 
chosen whether these regional issues are best approached by assuming that 
economic integration and prosperity generate peace or vice versa. Realists point 
at U.S. hegemony as the basis for regional stability whereas liberals emphasise 
economic interdependence.  Given the rise of an increasingly revisionist China, 
realists display growing pessimism about the durability of East Asian peace. 
Liberals, on the other hand, put hope in regional economic interdependence, 
risking neglecting that asymmetric interdependence in East Asia also means 
dependency and vulnerability, potentially leading to conflict. Finally the two 
authors point at the importance of regional institutional analysis in establishing 
whether the regional regimes of East Asia can be expected to underpin enduring 
peace. Can regional cooperation, despite its organisational weaknesses, facilitate 
understanding and peaceful relations of regional actors? They conclude that a 
more comprehensive understanding of the economic and security reality of the 
region requires a multidimensional conceptual approach, something which is 
indeed offered by this volume.
Miles Kahler from the University of California, San Diego, offers a highly 
recommendable, well organised and consistently argued contribution on the 
regional institutional dimension (‘Regional Economic Institutions and East Asian 
Security’). Critically questioning the liberal contention that the ‘Kantian tripod of 
democracy, international organization and economic interdependence’ will enhance 
regional security, he investigates systematically the potential of East Asian 
regional economic institutions for their capacity to prevent inter-state conflict. 
His conclusions are sobering: whereas grave security conflicts in the region, in 
particular between the regional powers China and Japan, but also including 
South Korea, Taiwan and North Korea, are potential inflammatory, regional 
institutions have failed so far to produce even the beginnings of something 
resembling a security community. Measured against the ideal-typical demands 
regional institutions would have to live up to for an effective promotion of security, 
Kahler demonstrates that the specific type of regional institutionalisation in East 
Asia fails on almost all counts. Firstly the authoritarian/democratic regime divide 
characteristic for East Asia stands in the way of a meaningful homogeneous peace 
community based on shared values. Secondly, regional economic interdependence 
in East Asia is the outcome of a market-driven, rather than a politically driven 
process, with mutual suspicions prevailing among nations that are closely 
guarding their national autonomy. This defensive attitude to pooling sovereignty 
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stands in the way of strong institutionalisation. Characteristically, so far regional 
trade agreements between the three powers most likely to drift into maritime 
territorial conflict, China, Japan and South Korea, are missing in the regional 
FTA architecture. Furthermore, as far as existing institutions are concerned, 
there is a strict division between the economic and the security aspects, leaving 
security within the realm of national sovereignty. Thirdly, the specific approach 
of East Asian region-building, the highly informal and open ASEAN or Asian 
way, which avoids supranational legalisation or strong governance structures, is 
ineffective. It militates against the creation of regional institutions which could 
play a substantive role in promoting and maintaining peace. As Kahler puts it, 
the Asian ‘convoy model of membership’, in contrast to the European ‘club model’, 
setting membership by vague geographical criteria rather than policy stipulations, 
is designed to preserve rather than pool national sovereignty, especially when it 
comes to issues affecting security. Consequently this model cannot be expected to 
have much of an impact on defusing conflict by prompting information sharing, 
peaceful bargaining around security issues or socialising member-states towards 
a fundamental transformation of their identities.
The conclusions arrived at by Kahler’s sceptical analysis contrast with 
the other two contributions which address the potential of East Asian regional 
economic institutions for security cooperation: Benjamin J. Cohen’s ‘Finance 
and Security in East Asia’ and Wu Xinbo’s ‘The Spillover Effect of the ASEAN-
Plus-Three Process on East Asian Security’. Benjamin J. Cohen (University of 
California, Santa Barbara) offers an inspiring, but somehow “bipolar” argument 
on the prospects for the nexus between financial cooperation and regional security 
in East Asia. On the one hand he delivers his well-known realist benchmark 
analysis that the prospects for regional financial and monetary cooperation in 
East Asia are bleak, given the high politics of security tensions in the region. 
In his words, ‘the real problem lies on the political side, where security tensions 
dominate. For all the talk of financial regionalism in East Asia, little real 
progress is possible without a significant moderation of underlying rivalries and 
animosities’. Furthermore, he righty locates these problems in the context of great 
power rivalry for regional hegemony, with China, Japan and the United States 
jockeying ‘for position in a wary pas de trois’. This is sound realist analysis. It 
logically concludes by drawing on Hegemonic Stability Theory: what is missing 
in East Asia for a breakthrough to meaningful cooperation in finance and even 
currency management is regional leadership by one asymmetrically strong power. 
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Since neither Japan nor China do qualify for such a role, such cooperation remains 
elusive.
But Cohen then shifts to a rather positive assessment of the actual prospects 
for East Asian regionalism, not only to govern economic interdependence and 
facilitate further integration, but also in the area of regional security cooperation. 
He manages this change in his narrative by switching to from a realist argument 
to one more along the lines of liberal regime theory and constructivism. The liberal 
aspect, the argument that there is a strong and unambiguous case for 
institutionalised regional economic cooperation, is questionable. Cohen points 
at dense regional production networks and econometric analyses that East Asia 
fulfils the criteria of optimum-currency-area-theory to argue that the political 
economy case for institutionalised financial and even monetary cooperation is 
strong. In addition he asserts that, as the case of Europe has demonstrated, 
‘obstacles to cooperation among states – no matter how seemingly prohibitive – 
can be overcome if political will is there.’ However, as Cohen admits, structural 
divergence among East Asian economies is substantial. Furthermore, his view 
that in matters of monetary affairs little domestic resistance to cooperation is 
to be expected and that positive OCA econometrics is enough for sustainable 
cooperation in exchange rate management looks weak in the light of the Euro 
crisis. Cohen seems to underestimate the politically and economically highly 
demanding nature of especially monetary integration in regards to domestic 
adjustment, compared to simple regional trade liberalisation. 
This leaves Cohen’s hopes for a spillover from deeper regional economic 
cooperation to security cooperation, based on the constructivist logic of 
socialisation towards shared identities and interests of national policymakers who 
engage in regularized contacts. Cohen expects that the common understandings 
developed in the epistemic community of policymakers concerned with economic 
cooperation might spill-over towards policymakers concerned with national 
security. As he puts it, ‘it is hard to believe that finance and foreign ministers do 
not talk to one another on occasion, sharing their impressions on relations with 
regional neighbors’. The idea that such occasional conversations could defuse the 
deteriorating security dynamics in East Asia seems fanciful. Cohen is aware of 
this, premising his hopes on a quantum leap in regional financial and monetary 
cooperation. As he explains, realistically such a jump is likely only if the current 
equilibrium of low-intensity economic cooperation, unsuitable for managing 
regional security conflicts, were punctuated by an external shock. Such a shock 
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could result from the current global financial meltdown, with the systemic crisis 
acting as catalyst for a move towards deepening economic regionalism opening the 
avenue towards a security community.
Wu Xinbo, from Fudan University, offers an unashamedly optimistic, 
highly interpretative chapter on the potential of the ASEAN-Plus-Three (APT) 
process spilling over into meaningful East Asian security cooperation. Arguing 
mainly from a social constructivist viewpoint, his optimistic predictions for an 
emerging regional security community might convince readers coming from the 
constructivist school of IR. Those who keep an eye on the deteriorating security 
relations in East Asia, especially in the light of recent developments, might be 
excused for suspecting that the author looks at reality through rose-tinted glasses. 
Wu’s argument starts from the social constructivist interpretation of the ASEAN 
way put forward by Amitav Acharya: despite the fact that regional economic 
institutions are ‘relatively primitive at this stage’, they are promising, because 
they suit East Asian societies ’ process-oriented approach to cooperation. 
Expanding on this reasoning, Wu sees APT cooperation as a successful first 
step towards constructing an East Asian security community including current 
adversaries such as China and Japan. This is not because East Asian regionalism 
has much to show in terms of results, but because it is a process whose ‘primary 
function is to enable actors to socialize with one another and build connections’. 
Such social interaction has the potential to create a shared identity on common 
regional security, because ‘social interactions can increase mutual understandings 
and mutual trust, expand connections, and develop friendship and affinity among 
states.’
Obviously, the rising tensions in the South and East China Seas, 
acknowledged by Wu, do not appear to be supportive of such assumptions. But, 
similar to Cohen,  Wu sustains his optimism by drawing on liberal concepts of 
functional and ideational spill-over: growing regional economic interdependence is 
seen as spilling over to effective cooperation in security-related areas, supposedly 
already evident in the large number of agreements and conferences addressing 
nontraditional security concerns and declarations of conduct addressing maritime 
security issues. The fact that all these meetings, conferences and declarations 
have not prevented the current escalation of tensions between China on the 
one side and Japan and South East Asian littoral nations on the other side is 
explained by Wu by three factors: cold-war thinking, the continuing central 
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role of the U.S. in East Asian security relations impeding the development of 
interregional security, and re-emerging nationalism especially in Japan. That no 
serious military clashes have taken place so far is taken as evidence that East 
Asia has already converged to a distinct autonomous regional norm of peaceful 
resolution of conflicts. This is, from Wu’s perspective, most visibly demonstrated by 
China’s avoidance of using PLAN navy vessels in the current island disputes and 
its repeated assurances of its peaceful and friendly intensions. Interpreting the 
manner in which the maritime securities tensions escalated recently as indicating 
a broader trend towards a pluralistic security community displays a preference for 
fiction over facts often found in weak constructivist analyses.
In contrast, Zhang Tuosheng from the China Foundation for International 
and Strategic Studies, in ‘Disputes over Territories and Maritime Rights and 
Interests: Their Political Economic Implications’,  offers a solid, detailed  review 
of the territorial disputes plaguing East Asia and their prospects for settlement. 
He manages to cover the whole range of disputes with or without Chinese 
involvement - from South East Asia to Russia, South Korea and Japan. The 
article is well organised along the lines of territorial versus maritime disputes, 
both of which are analysed for the political, security and economic interests at 
stake. Zhang concludes that, whereas territorial land disputes have been resolved 
or are manageable, it is the maritime disputes which constitute the greatest 
source for concern, given the geo-political strategic and geo-economic resources-
related issues at stake. What makes these conflicts particular protracted is the 
negative interaction between economic and security concerns. Zhang realistically 
concludes that in cases where ‘critical political, security, and economic interests 
are involved, the extent of improvement will be limited.’
Adding to Zhang’s realist review of potential conflicts, Danielle F. S. Cohen 
and Jonathan Kirshner from Cornell University present a fascinating and 
insightful analysis of a theme of central importance for the region’s political 
economy: the issue of energy security. In their article ‘The Cult of Energy 
Insecurity and Great Power Rivalry Across the Pacific’ they start from the novel 
assertion that great power rivalry between the U.S./Japan and China about 
securing the sources of, and the access to oil and gas is based on a myth. They 
dub this myth a ‘cult of energy insecurity’, rooted in the false belief that the 
energy lifeblood of their economies can be threatened by hostile powers and that 
this risk can be redressed by appropriate foreign policy and security strategies. 
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As the authors put it, ‘most threats to energy security are imagined, but even 
for those few concerns that are real, there is little that states can do about it’. 
Since the geo-strategic reality of world oil supplies and transport links is such 
that China cannot realistically expect to disrupt U.S.-backed Japanese energy 
security, nor can the U.S. realistically hope to cut off China, the real threat to 
oil supplies comes from oil’s volatile world market price, not its availability. The 
authors consequently contend that ‘price, not power, will determine where the 
world’s oil will go and how it will be used’. This price, they argue, is a function of 
the operation of global energy markets rather than of power politics. Whether this 
assertion is realistic remains open to debate. Not only does it neglect the linkages 
between oil prices and international security tensions affecting the Middle East 
and the critical supply routes from that region, it also seems strangely oblivious 
to historical experience, especially the highly effective US embargo policy against 
Japan leading up to the Second World War.
Whether concerns about energy insecurity are a cult or not, they matter 
greatly to the regional powers’ perceptions of vulnerability, confirmed by the two 
authors’ impressive geo-political analysis of the energy strategies of the U.S., 
China and Japan.  Their conclusion is as original as it is alarming: even if the 
perceived vulnerability to energy insecurity never materialised, the risks of geo-
political and geo-economic strategic rivalry spilling over into confrontation are 
substantial. The three paths to potential international conflict suggested by the 
authors are first China’s cultivation of close ties with resource rich nations such 
as Iran, Sudan or Venezuela, all of which are in conflict with the U.S., secondly the 
evolving naval competition in the Western Pacific and the potential for a security 
dilemma building up between China on the one side and Japan and the U.S. on 
the other side, and finally the competition for control of natural gas fields which 
contributes to escalating tensions between China and Japan in the East China 
Sea. Given the recent worrying developments in all three areas, whether it is 
China’s ambiguous stance on sanctions on Iran, its high sea naval build-up or  the 
escalating Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, Cohen’s and Kirshner’s chapter stands out in 
this book as one of the most prescient pieces of analysis.
Whereas Zhang and Cohen/Kirshner approach the geo-economic and 
political questions from a systemic-regional level, M. Taylor Fravel from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in ‘Economic Growth, Regime Insecurity, 
and Military Strategy: Explaining the Rise of Noncombat Operations in China’, 
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makes an important contribution by bringing in the relationship between China’s 
internal political economic dynamics and its external security strategy. This goes 
to the heart of the current security problematique in East Asia: will China’s rapid 
economic development and rise to regional power continue to be peaceful or lead 
to regional military conflict? Bringing in the otherwise in this book neglected 
‘second image’, Fravel’s analysis starts from the domestic challenge to China’s 
authoritarian regime of maintaining increasingly imbalanced and fragile rapid 
growth to prevent social unrest and hang on to power. Linking Chinese domestic 
strategy aimed at ensuring regime survival to China’s regional military strategy, 
Fravel’s investigation comes to a surprising conclusion: unbalanced rapid growth 
and resulting domestic regime instability has ‘reinforced China’s interest in 
external stability’. This analysis, which ‘provides cautious ground for limited 
optimism’ as to China’s rapid military modernisation and expansion, is based 
on two assumptions: first that China’s growing dependence on regional and 
global markets and resources gives it a stake in maintaining a stable and secure 
external environment, since any disruption to international commerce could 
spill over to domestic economic disruptions, declining growth, and consequently 
social unrest. Secondly, given China’s growing social, political and ethnic internal 
tensions and fragilities, China’s authoritarian leaders still see the military first of 
all as an instrument for maintaining domestic stability, resulting in an orientation 
of military capability-building mainly towards preventing or suppressing domestic 
unrest.  Consequently Fravel argues that ‘the continued domestic orientation of 
China’s armed forces’ and its international interest of maintaining ‘security of 
trade routes and sea lanes of communication’ has led to a strategy of military 
modernisation which focuses on domestic and international noncombat operations 
rather than on long-range power projection capabilities to fight regional wars. 
The thesis that China’s domestic fragilities and the threat this poses for regime 
survival has resulted in a peace-oriented and stabilising international military 
strategy stands in marked contrast to the diversionary hypothesis on internal 
instability: that desperate authoritarian leaders will try to deflect attention 
from domestic problems by provoking international conflict. Fravel bases 
his conclusions on extensive statistical analyses of military data and official 
statements. Whether his thesis will stand up to reality is questionable. The link 
between recent mass-mobilisation politics within China and escalating maritime 
tensions with Japan lends empirical support to the diversionary hypothesis. 
Furthermore, China’s rapid high-tech strategic build-up of its navy, including 
ballistic anti-ship missiles, and air force, including 5th generation stealth fighter 
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jets, belies a mainly noncombat orientation of its military modernisation.
Almost as an antidote to Farvel’s analysis of China’s military capabilities and 
strategy, Michael C. Horowitz from University of Pennsylvania, in ‘Information-
Age Economics and the Future of the East Asian Security Environment’, offers 
a potentially alarming analysis. He challenges the standard liberal hypothesis 
that China’s continued peaceful rise can be taken for granted because the 
rapid economic growth of China took place via intensifying regional economic 
interdependence. Presenting a unique technology-based analysis, he focuses on 
the link between economic interdependence, the global spread of commercial 
information technology, and the risk of a destabilising regional security dilemma. 
Horowitz concludes that the spread of these new technologies gives especially 
emerging China the ability to produce innovative military technologies for 
offensive power projection to challenge the status quo, even in the face of a 
seemingly insurmountable military and technological edge of the United States. 
Since the East Asian region contains enough cause for conflict, a competitive 
development of new high-tech strategic capabilities is likely to destabilise the 
fragile East Asian security environment. With the caveat that such predictions 
are speculative, Horowitz points especially at China, whose sense of rising relative 
power might in his view be further increased by these new offensive capabilities, 
with potentially dangerous consequences.  This is good realism, investigating 
the effect of a new quality in the dynamics of defence competition, brought in by 
technology and globalisation, on great power competition in the region.
Last but not least, Yuan Peng from the China Institute of Contemporary 
International Relations, in ‘The China-U.S. Handshake in Northeast Asia: The 
Key to Dual Stability in Bilateral Ties and Regional Equilibrium’, presents the 
only essay which directly addresses the relationship between the U.S. and China. 
Yuan rightly identifies this relationship as decisive for the economic and security 
prospects of the region. After reviewing four competing Chinese perspectives on 
this relationship, he supports a view which predicts enduring and even enhanced 
cooperation in the economic and security field between the two powers, despite 
growing strategic and economic competition and conflicting views and policies on 
the North Korean, Taiwan and the East and South China Seas maritime issues. 
Underlying this analysis is the thesis that current tensions between China and 
the U.S. are mainly rooted in the problem that the United States’ attitude to the 
East Asia region and China’s rise is still shrouded in the shadows of the Cold War, 
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failing to fully appreciate that China’s resurgence represents part of a ‘collective 
rise of the non-Western world’. Once the U.S. overcomes this attitude problem, 
the path to constructive co-management of the region will be opened. This is 
the well-known “Cold War mentality” thesis propagated by Chinese academia, 
suggesting that U.S. views of China are somehow caught up in a slightly neurotic 
perception of the world which is out of touch, unable to acknowledge reality. In 
this idiosyncratic Chinese version of constructivism the West in general and 
the U.S. in particular have to learn to understand that ‘China has adopted an 
independent path of peaceful socialist development with Chinese characteristics’ 
which considers East Asia as ‘the apple of China’s eye’, whereas America’s 
core interests supposedly lie outside the Asia-Pacific region. Yuan then identifies 
the continued centrality of the security alliance with Japan in America’s East Asia 
strategy as a hallmark of this outdated Cold-War legacy and suggests promoting a 
trilateral regional dialogue instead.
Given the economic interdependence of China and the U.S. and the economic 
logic for cooperation, Yuan predicts that the two countries will embrace innovative 
mechanisms for security cooperation to ‘usher-in a future-oriented political 
atmosphere of enduring peace and prosperity’. How this new warm breeze of peace 
is exactly going to come about, given the reality of an increasingly harsh climate 
of rising competition and tensions between the two countries,  is not explained in 
any detail by Yuan, who simply points at the need for the U.S. to free itself from 
the ‘Cold War straitjacket’.  As to China’s role in this, he leaves us with vague 
assurances that everything will work out if the U.S. only understood and accepted 
China’s regional policies as the new stabilising standard for a joint management 
of the region. Yuan’s assertions are representative of what Michael S. Chase, 
in the Jamestown Foundation’s ‘China Brief’ (2012/17), identified as a growing 
school of Chinese authors who call for a ‘new type of great power relationship’ 
between the US and China.  As Chase explains, the most problematic aspect 
of this new Chinese vision of U.S.-China relations is that ‘it appears to require 
Washington to accommodate China's interests and to do so largely on Beijing's 
terms - apparently without reciprocal adjustments’.
To conclude, this edited volume combines contributions from a rationalist 
perspective, combining liberal-institutionalist and realist IR and IPE, with 
those from a more social constructivist angle. The rationalist essays generally 
impress by solid factual analysis of major features and issues relevant for an 
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understanding of the deteriorating dynamics of the security-economy nexus 
in East Asia. Furthermore, the rationalist approaches include one article, 
the contribution of M. Taylor Fravel, which distinguishes itself by taking the 
domestic-international interaction in regional security analysis seriously. Social 
constructivist contributors, speculating on the benign effect of continuous dialogue 
and cooperation on the prospects for future understanding and friendship in the 
region, display an amazing disinterest in the specifics of the domestic construction 
of conflicting national identities. They might be excused for the omission of 
discussing the political economy and security dimension of Japan’s nationalism, 
since none of the authors is a Japan specialist. However, the lack of analysis of the 
rising and increasingly fierce nationalism in China, from a regional security point 
of view an extremely worrying development, and its link to the fragile domestic 
political economy and internal politics of the country, is a different matter – here 
contributors avoid the issue by shifting the focus towards perceived problems of 
international misunderstandings. Because the constructivist arguments avoid 
addressing the linkages between the domestic socio-economic contradictions 
of China’s variety of capitalism, the construction by the Communist party of a 
fiercely nationalist narrative to legitimise its rule, and an increasingly assertive 
regional foreign policy stance, they fail to provide a convincing case for why 
the regional dynamics is not as concerning as it appears to be. Instead the 
constructivist argument risks substituting optimistic idealism for proper analysis. 
In the end, we are left with little more than an appeal to become friends on the 
lines of that famous scene in the movie ‘Mars Attacks!’ in which Jack Nicholson, 
playing the U.S. President, tries to open a conversation with the Martian leader 
with: ‘Why can't we work out our differences? Why can't we all just get along?’. 
Consequently constructivist reasoning in this volume cannot disperse worries that 
the alarming developments in regional security and economic relations are not 
just a temporary hick-up but might spiral out of control. 
Proper IR and IPE analysis of the nexus between economics and security in 
East Asia cannot afford to pay only scant attention to the domestic dimension 
of the revisionist regional foreign policy strategy of a key regional actor - China. 
Of course, Chinese commentators prefer to keep internal economic and political 
issues strictly separated from the international discussion of the country’s 
regional strategy. They consider Western analysts drawing a connection between 
these two areas as interfering in China’s internal affairs. However, especially 
when it comes to East Asian international relations, George Orwell’s famous 
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observation that ‘war, it will be seen, is now a purely internal affair’ is to the 
point. New IPE scholarship is fully aware not only of the problematic link between 
economics and security in growing regional interdependence, but also that the 
analysis of the international economic and security strategy of great powers has 
to take account of its interaction with domestic politics. It would be regrettable 
if this insight were suspended when it comes to analysing China in the nexus 
between economics and security in East Asia.
